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Abstract
Successive British governments since the early 1980s have introduced a host of
educational policy reforms in an attempt to raise pupil performance at school. One
of the most important educational policies in the secondary education sector was the
specialist schools policy, which was introduced in 1994. Using data from the YCS for
pupils who left school in either 2002 or 2004, a period of rapid expansion of the specialist
schools programme, we seek to evaluate the effects of the policy. Unlike most previous
work in this area we investigate the effects of the policy on test scores and truancy for
pupils at school, but also assess whether the policy had direct and/or indirect effects
on post-school outcomes, such as labour market status, wages and A-Level scores. We
show that specialist schools did raise test scores during compusory schooling, and that
the policy had a positive and statistically significant effect in raising the probability
of employment. The evidence on A-level scores suggests a negative effect and, due to
data limitations, no effect on wages is apparent. Although we stop short of claiming
that our findings are causal, they do imply that policy makers need to take a more
comprehensive view of the effects of education policies when trying to address whether
they deliver value for money to the taxpayer.
∗The authors would like to thank Nuffield Foundation for the financial support to this work.
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1 Introduction
Successive British governments since the early 1980s have introduced a host of educational
policy reforms, such as the 1988 Education Reform Act, which led to the creation of a quasi-
market in education. Funding for secondary schools has also been increased substantially
since 1997, rising from £9.9bn to £15.8bn in 2006/7, equivalent to an increase in real ex-
penditure per pupil increased by over 50% (from £3206 to £4836 in 2005/6 prices). One of
the most important educational policies in secondary education in this time period was the
specialist schools policy, which was introduced in 1994. To obtain specialist status, state
maintained schools were required to raise unconditional sponsorship from the private sec-
tor of £50,000 and to have a development plan. Selected schools then received a capital
grant of £100,000 from central government, and around £130 per pupil over a four year
period, equivalent to a 5% increase in per pupil funding.1 In addition to increasing the
funding of schools, the specialist schools policy also simultaneously enhanced parental choice
of the school their child would attend, and competition between schools for pupils, because
schools were encouraged to specialise in particular subjects.2 The earliest specialist schools
were Technology schools, starting in 1994, constituting approximately 20% of all schools by
2007, with significant proportions of schools focusing on Arts, Sport and Science. Other
specialisms, such as Business and Maths were introduced more recently in 2002.3 Specialist
schools are encouraged to spread good practice to non-specialist schools in the same edu-
cational district with respect, for instance, to teaching methods. Over 80% of secondary
1The capital grant was reduced to £25,000 in recent years but was higher for the time period covered by
this study.
2It is worth noting that although specialist schools are encouraged to focus on particular subjects, all
schools are also required to deliver a national curriculum. Thus, most pupils will typically study around
10 subjects in their final two years of compulsory schooling between the ages of 14 and 16. They then sit
nationally recognised tests, the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE), in each subject.
The GCSE is a norm-based examination taken by almost all pupils, and the grades range from A* to G.
Grades A* to C are considered acceptable for entry to university, together with the acquisition of advanced
qualifications obtained two years later. Pupils of lower ability may also take General National Vocational
Qualifications instead of GCSEs.
3See the Department for Children, Schools and Families website for more details:
www.standards.dcsf.gov.uk/specialistschools.
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schools are now specialist and the policy has since been abandoned as priorities have shifted
in favour of the academy schools initiative.
The key objective of the specialist schools policy was to improve the test score perfor-
mance of secondary school pupils. There are two different mechanisms by which the policy
could affect test scores - funding and specialisation effects. The increase in resources to
specialist schools creates a funding effect whereby increased spending on books and equip-
ment, for instance, improves the quality of the educational experience throughout the school
and hence may improve test scores in all subjects. However, by allowing greater subject
specialisation, parents can select those schools that ‘match’ the aptitudes and skills of their
children, thereby increasing allocative efficiency. ‘Better’ subject specialist teachers may also
move to schools that specialise in their subject area. Hence test scores in particular subjects
may increase - a specialisation effect. Clearly, if specialist schools are shown to increase the
test scores of pupils then, indirectly, the policy may also affect post-school outcomes since
test scores have been shown to be highly correlated with staying on rates and wages, for
instance. We test for such indirect effects. However, it is also important to know whether
the specialist schools policy had a direct effect on post-school outcomes. This may arise via
the specialisation effect insofar as pupils acquire skills and knowledge in those subjects in
which the school specialises which are also highly valued in the labour market. Obtaining
estimates of the direct and indirect effects of the specialist schools policy is helpful to policy-
makers interested in determining whether educational initiatives are ‘value for money’. As
far as we are aware this is the first paper to investigate the direct and indirect effects of the
policy on post-school outcomes.
The main questions we address in this paper are as follows: First, we begin by asking
whether the specialist schools policy has had an effect on test scores and truancy behaviour
of pupils. Second, conditional on test score performance, are pupils who have attended
specialist schools more likely to continue their education beyond the compulsory school
leaving age? Thirdly, for those young people who enter the labour market is there a wage
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premia associated with attendance at a specialist school? Fourthly, has the specialist school
policy led to improvements in educational attainment at the post-compulsory level, such as
A-level qualifications. To answer these questions we use the Youth Cohort Surveys, cohorts
11-12, which refer to young people who finish compulsory schooling between 2002 and 2004,
a period of time over which the number of specialist schools expanded rapidly.
It is not straightforward to evaluate the effect of the specialist schools policy on edu-
cational or labour market outcomes because these schools were not randomly selected to
participate in the policy. Indeed, there are likely to be several sources of bias that must
be mitigated in an evaluation of the specialist schools policy. One source of bias arises di-
rectly from the non-random selection of schools into the policy (hereafter school selection
bias). Figure 1 shows that specialist schools have tended to outperform non-specialist schools
throughout the history of the policy, and Bradley and Migali (2011) present evidence to sug-
gest that specialist schools are increasingly likely to have test scores in the highest quintile of
test scores, which is strongly suggestive of non-random assignment of certain types of school
into the specialist schools initiative. A closely related source of bias is the non-random se-
lection of pupils into specialist schools (pupil selection bias), insofar as unobservably more
able pupils are ‘cream-skimmed’ by ‘good’ (specialist) schools. Specialist schools are, for
instance, more likely to have a higher percentage of pupils from richer social backgrounds
and are more likely to have a lower percentage of ethnic minority pupils (Bradley and Migali,
2011). It is difficult to disentangle these two sources of bias with available data, nevertheless
in trying to measure the impact of the specialist schools policy on educational and labour
market outcomes it is important to try and do so. We do so by adopting matching methods
for the analysis of test scores at the pupil and school level, and a control function approach
for post-school outcomes.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss the small
literature that has attempted to measure the impact of various educational policies. This is
followed by a discussion of our data and statistical methods. Section 4 presents our results
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which is followed by our concluding comments.
2 Literature
2.1 The effect of the specialist schools policy on test scores
There is a growing literature on the evaluation of the specialist schools policy on test score
outcomes at school. For example, Gorard (2002), Jessson (2002, 2004), Jesson and Crossley
(2004) and OFSTED (2005) find a positive effect on test scores. Most of this early work
use school level or pupil level data to estimate cross-sectional OLS models. For instance,
Jesson finds that specialist schools increased the percentage of pupils obtaining 5 or more
GCSEs grades A*-C by between 4.5 percentage points and 5 percentage points, and total
points score is increased by 4.2%. These are large effects but no allowance is made for the
different types of selection bias. Schagen, Davies, Rudd and Schagen (2002) do raise some
issues regarding the methodological approach of this early work, arguing that pupil level
data and multi-level modelling techniques should be used. Estimated effects of the policy
arising from this study are considerably smaller at between 0.02-0.11 of a GCSE point with
some variation by subject - maths (0.04-0.06), English (0.03-0.09) and science (-0.03-0.07).
Benton et al (2003), again using multi-level modelling techniques with pupil level data, find
that the specialist schools policy raised GCSE grades, or points, by 1.1. Similarly, Levacic
and Jenkins (2006) using data for 2001 find a very similar effect at 1.4 GCSE points. These
authors also found some variation by subject of specialisation and the duration of the policy.
Taylor (2007) finds that the specialist schools policy has had very little impact on av-
erage test scores, though there is evidence of more substantial impacts for specific areas of
specialisation, for example, business and technology. Bradley and Taylor (2010) estimate
the impact of the specialist schools policy, as well as other educational policies, using school-
level panel data, and find a small positive effect of specialist schools on test scores. However,
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many of these papers fail to allow for the bias that often arises in programme evaluation
settings, which calls into question whether they have been able to identify a causal effect of
the specialist schools policy. Furthermore, many of these studies do not explicitly consider
the mechanisms by which the specialist schools policy could affect the test score outcomes of
pupils. Bradley, Migali and Taylor (2012) use matching methods combined with a difference-
in-differences approach on pupil data drawn from several versions of the NPD (2002-2005)
and find a modest effect of the policy. In an extension of this work Bradley and Migali (2012)
investigate the effects of both the specialist schools and EiC policies and find that, whilst
the latter has a greater effect on pupil test scores, there is also a complementary effect of
the two policies.
There is a broader literature (see Hanushek (1998) for a survey) which focuses on the
effectiveness of school resources, which is also relevant to this paper. For example, using US
data on expenditure and National Assessment of Education Progress test scores, Krueger
(1998, 2000) finds modest gains in test scores due to increase in expenditures and Hanushek
(1998) does not find any strong relationship between resources and student performance.
Machin and McNally (2011) also provide a summary of the effects of a variety of British
educational policies.
There is very little prior research on the labour market effects of educational policies
and none on the effect of the specialist school initiative. There is a very large literature on
the returns to education but this tends to focus on the wage returns to an extra ‘unit’ of
education, rather than on the effect of a particular education policy. In fact, studies of this
kind are hard to find. Nevertheless, education economists have in recent years investigated
the effects of different aspects of education policy on labour market outcomes, such as the
effect of a central exam system on wages (Backes-Gellner and Veen, 2006) and the effect
of school type (general versus technical, public versus private) on employment probabilities,
wages and the transition to HE (Cappellari, 2004; Margolis and Simonnet, 2002).
Other literature..
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3 Data and descriptives
The data used in this analysis are the Youth Cohort Surveys (YCS) of England and Wales,
versions 11 and 12, which refer to the 2002-2004 period. The YCS is a major programme
of longitudinal research designed to monitor the behaviour and decisions of representative
samples of young people (around 14,000 per survey) aged 16 and upwards. The survey records
educational outcomes and provides a wealth of information on the socio-demographics of the
pupil’s family. By combining school level data with the pupil level data in the YCS we
are able to observe precisely when each school switches from non-specialist (‘policy-off’) to
specialist (‘policy-on’) status to investigate how the test scores of different cohorts of pupils
change. Specifically, we link schools in YCS11 with the same schools in YCS12 and restrict
attention to those pupils in a non-specialist school in 2001/02 (‘policy-off’) and compare
them with pupils in the same school which acquired specialist status during 2002/04 (‘policy-
on’). This reduces the original sample to 5,244. This approach allows us to go some way
to controlling for school selection bias since we essentially difference out unobserved school
fixed effects. Pupil selection bias should also not be a problem since all of the pupils in
the analysis had chosen a non-specialist school, which then becomes specialist during their
period of secondary schooling (policy on). One potential drawback of this type of analysis
is the fact that we cannot distinguish year effects and cohort effects, because the inclusion
of these dummies would be perfectly collinear with the treatment variable. Consequently,
we assume that temporal exogenous shocks affect all schools in the same way, hence shifting
the distribution of pupil attainment.
Each YCS also comprises three sweeps conducted at the ages 16, 17 and 18. For each
sweep the young person is asked about their educational and labour market status. In
the first sweep the information includes their experiences and achievements at school, and
their personal and family characteristics. For young people who proceed to post-compulsory
education, the Survey also collects information on the type of course taken, and the grades
achieved. We link to the YCS data information on the school, including information on
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whether a school is specialist or not, which is obtained from the annual School Performance
Tables and the School Census. Using these data we are able to investigate ‘early career’
outcomes.
Tables 1 shows three measures of test score outcome for the combined sample YCS11-
12. The first is the total GCSE score (GCSEscore), taken at age 16, that is, the number of
points achieved in all GCSE subjects, where grades are ranked from A∗=8 points to fail=0.
The second is a binary variable indicating whether a pupil obtained 5 or more GCSE grades
A*-C (GCSEbin). The third measure is also a dummy variable indicating whether a pupil
obtained 10 or more GCSE grades A*-C (GCSEbin10 ), which refers to the upper end of the
ability distribution. In each case we distinguish between pupils who were in non-specialist
schools in YCS11 and compare their test score performance against pupils in specialist
schools in YCS12, that is, schools that had acquired specialist status between YCS11 and
YCS12. Table 1 shows that pupils who attended specialist schools have a higher GCSE
points score (GCSEscore) although a lower proportion achieve 5 or more GCSEs A*-C. The
latter finding is probably explained by the fact that specialist school pupil performance is
massively greater than their non-specialist school pupils at the upper end of the test score
distribution (GCSE-10+A*-C). Pupils in schools that have specialist status have a much
lower propensity to truant by about 14 percentage points.
The bottom of Table 1 and Table 2 provide descriptive statistics on post-school test
scores (A-Level score). Due to data limitations we focus on YCS12 and we append, to the
original sample of 10270 pupils, school level data. Once again this enables us to to distinguish
between schools that became specialist between 1994 and 1999 (the start of the specialist
school programme and the year before pupils enrolled in secondary school) and non-specialist
schools. The latter schools actually acquired specialist status between 2004 and 2006 on the
grounds that these schools are likely to be most similar to those schools that were specialist
at the time of YCS12. This restriction makes our comparison groups more homogenous but
we lose around 50% of the initial sample. Panel B of Table 1 shows A-level test score and
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mean number of A levels studied.4 We observe that pupils that attended specialist schools
on average outperform those from non-specialist schools in terms of A-level qualifications.
Looking at Table 2, the majority of pupils continue their full time studies in wave 1,
although those coming from a specialist school are 3 percentage points more likely to do
so. Furthermore, the raw data also shows that pupils from specialist schools have a slightly
greater probability of securing employment after leaving and a consequently lower risk of
entering the NEET categority (Not in eduction, employment or training). The percentage
of pupils continuing their education at wave 2 is much lower, although pupils from special-
ist schools are more likely to study for longer (52% of pupils stay-on from non-specialist
schools versus 55% from specialist schools). Interestingly, the percentage of pupils from non-
specialist schools in employment by wave 2 is higher when compared to their counterparts
from specialist schools, perhaps reflecting the greater success in the labour market of the
group of non-specialist school pupils who leave college after 1 year. However, pupils that
had been educated in specialist schools were still less likely to enter the NEET categort. By
wave 3 the outcomes of the two groups of pupils have more or less equalised, which suggests
that any advantage that a specialist school education provides may be short lived.
Finally, for those pupils in employment, log real wages are very similar for pupils from
specialist and non-specialist schools. Wages rise from wave 1 to wave 2 and then drop in
wave 3.
4 Statistical methodology
We follow two econometric methodologies, the first is based on cross-sectional matching and
estimates the effect of specialist schools on education test scores. The second is a control
function approach and estimates the effect of specialist schools on further education and
labor market outcomes.
4A Level qualifications are taken during post-compulsory schooling, typically by pupils aged 16-19. They
are pre-requisites for entry to HE in the UK.
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4.1 Matching methods
Our approach is based on the concept of the education production function wherein educa-
tional outcomes, such as test scores are a function of personal, family and school inputs, as
well as specialist school status. However, to estimate the effect of the specialist schools policy
on pupils’ test scores requires a solution to the counterfactual question of how pupils would
have performed had they not attended a specialist school. We adopt the non-parametric
matching method which does not require an exclusion restriction, or a particular specifica-
tion of the model for attendance at a specialist school. Thus, the main purpose of matching
is to find a group of non-treated pupils who are similar to the treated in all relevant pre-
treatment characteristics, x, the only remaining difference being that one group attended
a specialist school and another group did not. In the first stage we therefore estimate the
propensity score (PS) using a discrete response model of attendance at a specialist school.
One assumption of the matching method is the common support or overlap condition
which ensures that pupils with the same x values have a positive probability of attending a
specialist school. A second, and key assumption is the conditional independence assumption
(CIA), which implies that selection into treatment is solely based on observable character-
istics.5 There may, however, be a problem of hidden bias due to unobserved effects, and
any positive association between a pupil’s treatment status and test score outcomes may not
therefore represent a causal effect. If the assumption of ignorability (i.e. no hidden bias)
fails, the treatment is endogenous and the matching estimates will be biased (Heckman et
al. 1998). Several tests have been developed to assess whether hidden bias is a problem
in cross-sectional models and we adopt the method proposed by Ichino et al. (2008) and
Rosenbaum (1987). The details of these tests are reported in Appendix A.
Given these two assumptions, the matching method allows us to estimate the average
treatment effect on the treated (ATT). The ATT estimator is the mean difference in outcomes
5Conditional on a set of pre-treatment observable variables x, potential outcomes are independent of
assignment to treatment.
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over the common support, weighted by the propensity score distribution of participants.









where T and C represent treatment and control groups, respectively. Wij is the weight placed
on the jth observation in constructing the counterfactual for the ith treated observation. Y1
is the outcome of participants and Y0 of non-participants; wi is the re-weighting that recon-
structs the outcome distribution for the treated sample. A number of well-known matching
estimators exist which differ in the way they construct the weights, Wij. We use two match-
ing algorithms, nearest neighbor (NN) and kernel with bandwidth 0.1. Analytical standard
errors are provided for the first estimator (Abadie and Imbens, 2008) and bootstrapped
standard errors for the second (Heckman et al. 1998).
A further issue arises insofar as expenditure per pupil has risen for reasons other than
the specialist schools policy and we must control for this. Therefore, we estimate a post-
matching regression including real expenditure per pupil, measured in 2003 prices, of the
form:6
Yis = α + βSpecis + γp̂(xi) + ρSpecis(p̂(xi)− µp) + θExpis + εis (2)
where p̂(xi) = P (Specis = 1|xi) is the estimated propensity score, µp is the sample
average of p̂(xi) and Expis are the expenditure per pupil in school s. Since we only have
data on expenditure from 1999, we restrict our sample to schools that become specialist
from 1999 to 2002, and schools that are non-specialist in the same period but which become
specialist between 2003 and 2005.
6In the post-matching analysis we adopt a control function approach using the propensity score
(Wooldridge, 2005 and Rosembaum and Rubin, 1983). We regress our dependent variable (test scores)
on the treatment dummy variable (Spec), the estimated propensity score and its deviation from the mean
interacted with Spec. The coefficient of the Spec dummy consistently estimates ATE. In our specific case,
we add in the post-matching regression the expenditure per pupil variable and its deviation from the mean
interacted with Spec. In this way we want to get the treatment effect corrected for the fact that the control
group changes over time.
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4.2 Control Function method
We turn now to the statistical methods adopted to assess the effect of the specialist schools
policy on post-school outcomes. Our baseline model involves the estimation of the following
equation
Yi = α + γSpeci + βXi + i (3)
where Y variable represents either further education outcomes or labor market outcomes,
Spec indicates whether a pupil has attended a specialist or non-specialist school. The vector,
x, includes a series of controls. The main problem for the estimation of equation 3 is
the presence of ability bias which implies that the effect of specialist school on outcome
reflects both unobservable differences across pupils as well as the effect of the policy per
se, so that OLS are biased upwards. A common solution to this empirical problem is to
adopt instrumental variable (IV) methods, however it is not easy to find variables both
uncorrelated with the unobservables determinants of outcomes and correlated with the policy
variable. Therefore, we adopt a two-step selection model or control function estimator,
which is more restrictive than IV. We estimate as first step a propensity score model of
school participation in the specialist school programme. We match schools similar in all pre-
treatment characteristics except being specialist or non-specialist and we estimate a probit
S∗s = δ + ρZs + vs (4)
where Ss = 1 if schools s acquired specialist status between 1994 and 1999 and Ss = 0 if
school s is non-specialist but will acquire specialist status after 2004.
We use the estimated probit coefficients from equation 4, to compute the predicted proba-
bility of a school acquiring specialist status, denoted specscore. We then merge this variable,
at school level, with the pupil data. All pupils in the same school are associated with the
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same value of specscore. As a second step we estimate Equation 5:
Yi = α + λ1 specscorei + λ2Gcsescorei + λ3 (Gcsescorei × specscorei) + βXi + ui (5)
By including specscore in equation 5 we hope to correct for the fact that pupils in specialist
schools are unobservably different to those pupile in non-specialist schools for the reasons
cited in the Introduction. We also include a test score variable, Gcsescore, to control for
prior attainment, and we interact this variable with specscore to try to capture the indirect
effects. The vector X groups individual characteristics (such as age and gender), family
background (whether the parents are in a profession/managerial or less qualified job, whether
the pupil has only one parent) and school characteristics (whether the pupils has attended
a comprehensive or modern school, and whether the schools was a only boys or a only girls
school).
This approach is more restrictive than IVs because it relies on the assumption of mean
independence of u from Spec and Z conditional on v:
E[u|v, Spec, Z] = E[u|v] = f(v) (6)
where f is the control function.
However, the advantage of this method is that we estimate the effect of specialist schools on
outcomes across the whole distribution of unobservables, in particular at the mean. Thus, the
control function method, unlike IV, yields estimates that are comparable to the much simpler
least squares regression method. Furthermore, to better control for school self-selection in
the specialist school programme, we repeat our approach by considering in the first step only
school in the first 65% percentiles of the specscore distribution. We define spec65 this new
variable which replaces specscore in equation 5.
In general, we estimate four different models according to the definition of the depen-
dent variable. The first model considers post-school (labour market) outcomes, we define a
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categorical variable
Yi =1 if individual i is in full-time education
=2 if individual i is in full-time job
=3 if individual i is NEET
=0 otherwise.
In this case we estimate equation 5 as a multinomial logit and we compute the marginal
effects. In the second model we use the natural logarithm of real hourly wages as a continuous
dependent variable and we estimate equation 5 using OLS regressions. The third model
uses as dependent variable the average between the number of A2 points and AS points
cumulative to wave 3. We estimate equation 5 as Poisson regressions and we compute the
marginal effects. Finally, in the fourth model the dependent variable is the total number of
A2 and AS achieved cumulative to wave 3. Equation 5 is estimated by OLS regressions.
5 Results
5.1 A ‘policy-on’ versus ‘policy-off’ analysis
Table 3 shows that, prior to matching, pupils in a given school during a ‘policy-on’ period
obtain around 2.8 GCSE points more than their counterparts in the same school in the
‘policy-off’ period (Gcsescore).7 After matching we observe a reduction in the effect on
GCSE points score by between 15-37%, with the estimated impact falling to between 1.7-
2.0 points, depending on which estimator is used. Interestingly, there is no statistically
significant difference in the proportion of pupils obtaining 5 or more GCSEs graded A*-C
(Gcsebin). However, at the very top of the attainment distribution (Gcsebin10 ) a positive
7The probit model for selection (choice) into (of) specialist schools contain personal (gender, ethnicity),
parental (e.g. occupational status, parental qualifications) and school characteristics that could affect the
choice or selection decisions of school administrators and pupils. In terms of school variables, we use the
lagged GCSE performance of the school. Most variables are highly statistically significant.
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and statistically significant effect is observed. In fact, the pre-match estimate of 0.09 falls
to between 0.07-0.08 implying that the specialist schools policy increased the probability of
obtaining 10+ GCSE grades A*-C by between 7-8 percentage points.
The inclusion of a confounder variable does not dramatically change our results. This is
also confirmed by the Rosembaum test (see Table 3, lower panel) in a situation of up to 50%
hidden bias. As an additional robustness check we estimate equation 2 which corresponds to
a post-matching regression that includes expenditure per pupils at school level. We notice
that the effect of the policy remains substantially unchanged compared to the matching
estimates. In particular, for Gcsescore the effect is 1.86, a values that lies between the
nearest neighbour and kernel estimates. The same happens for Gcsebin10, while the effect
for Gcsebin is still insignificant. Note that in this analysis we mitigate the bias arising from
school selection bias, this is because we remove unobserved school fixed effects and due to
the short time framework of the analysis it is also unlikely to be affected by pupil selection
bias.
With regard to truancy, the evidence suggests that prior to using matching methods, spe-
cialist school pupils have 4.7 percentage point lower probability of truanting, which is very
close to the mean difference reported above. Post matching our estimates suggest that this
is about 4 percentage points depending on whether the nearest neighbour of kernel matching
method is used. Inclusion of a confounder variable, designed to pick up the effects of unob-
served differences between specialist and non-specialist pupils, shows that the probability of
a pupil from a specialist school is 5.4 percentage points lower that it is for their counterpart
from a non-specialist school. This is about 1.5 percentage points higher than the estimates
from the models without the confounder variable and implies that pupils from non-specialist
schools are, not only observably different to their counterparts from specialist schools with
respect to truancy behaviour, but they are also unobservably different.
In sum, this section of the paper has sought to demonstrate that specialist school pupils
have a higher test scores and lower probabilities of truanting after allowance is made for
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observable (and unobservable) differences between pupils. Although our models do seek to
control for the different types of selection bias discussed in the Introduction, we stop short
of claiming that the relationship between specialist school attendance has a causal effect on
these school outcomes. Nevertheless, they are indicative of an effect, which in turn implies
that specialist schools may have an indirect effect on post school outcomes (e.g. via test
scores) as well as a possible direct effect.
5.2 The effect of the specialist school policy on labour market
outcomes
We report all the results of estimating of the control function models. As explained in
Section 4.2, the first step in each model is always the same and allows use to obtain the two
variables specscore and specs65. The school matching passes the balancing test. The probit
model of attendance at a specialist school contains pre-treatment school characteristics,
such as the (lagged) GCSE performance of the school, the type of school (e.g. modern,
comprhensive), and whether the school is a girls-only or a boys-only school. All variables
are highly statistically significant.
Looking Table 4 we show the results for the labor market outcomes. We distinguish on
the one hand between a direct effect of the policy and an indirect effect arising via test scores,
and between two measures of the policy, that is, the continuous variable specscore (columns
2-4) and the categorical variable specs65 (columns 5-7). In terms of the former, we find
that pupils who attend schools with a higher propensity of becoming a specialist school are
less likely to stay on, conditional on a variety of covariates and pupil test score, This effect
declines over time. However, there is a direct effect of specscore on the probability of pupils
finding a job after leaving school, raising this probability by 1.8 percentage points in wave 1.
Moreover, the effect increases over time and remains statistically significant - by wave 2 the
effect is 2 percentage points and 3.6pp by wave 3. These effects are strong especially when
compared against the effect of pupil test scores (gcsescore). All of these results are largely
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confirmed when we look at specs65, the categorical measure of the policy effect, although
the magnitude of the effects reduces somewhat.
In the matching analysis we showed that attendance at a specialist school is at least
correlated with higher test scores, which raises the possibility of an indirect effect on post-
school and labour market outcomes. To capture this indirect effect we interact gcsescore
and specscore, and our estimates suggest that the combined effect of a school with a higher
underlying propensity of becoming a specialist school and pupils with higher test scores lead
to increase in the probability that pupils will stay on beyond the age of 16. This effect
persists for waves 1 and 2 and in magnitude implies a modest 1 percentage point increase in
that probability. The effect becomes insignificant by wave 3 which is unsurprising given the
descriptive evidence presented above. The indirect effect of specialist schools is to reduce by
0.5-1 percentage point the probability of being in employment in waves 1-3, which counters
the direct effect discussed above. However, since the indirect effect of specialist schools on
the probability of a pupil being employed is much lower than the direct effect, overall we can
still claim that attendance at a specialist school does seem to improve pupil prospects in the
labour market. Interestingly, there is also a very small but statistically significant indirect
effect of specialist schools on the probability of being NEET.
Table 5 reports the wage premia associated with prior attendance at a specialist school.8
There is some evidence that graduates from such schools earn more than their counterparts
in non-specialist schools, however, these effects are statistically insignificant. The indirect
effects are also negative, which does seem perverse, and statistically insignificant.
5.3 Post-school educational attainment
We turn now to the effects of the specialist school policy on post-secondary school educational
attainment, which refer to qualifications obtained either through further education at colleges
8Note that the sample in each YCS survey ranges between 1000 and 3800 wage observations. In YCS9-10
and YCS11 the proportion of individuals in specialist schools is small and in each wave we observe between
200 and 700 wages. In YCS12 the sample is quite balanced and more than half of the observed wages are
for individuals in specialist schools. Sample size is likely to effect the precision of our estimates.
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or schools. We distinguish between performance in academic subjects (A level exams), which
are the main stepping stone into higher education, and the number of A level subjects studied.
The results of our analysis are reported in Table 6 and are limited to wave 3 of YCS12. In
terms of performance in A level exams we compute the total points score and it is clear
that the direct effect of attendance at a specialist school is to reduce this by about 18
points. There is a modest positive counteracting indirect effect. These findings appear odd
at first sight, however, it may be that because pupils from specialist schools take more A
level subjects (see the largest positive direct effect) there efforts are spread and hence test
performance falls.
6 Conclusion
This paper is the first paper to attempt to measure the effect of a UK government education
policy, the specialist schools initiative, on post-school outcomes. Specifically, we seek to
evaluate whether the specialist schools policy had direct and/or indirect effects on the post-
compulsory school outcomes of school leavers and the early labour market outcomes of young
adults. To do this we use data for several cohorts of the YCS, which is combined with school
level data, and then employ matching methods and a two stage control function approach
to attempt to control for various forms of bias that are likely to be present in cross-sectional
analyses.
Initially we demonstrate that specialist school pupils have higher test scores and lower
probabilities of truanting after allowance is made for observable (and unobservable) differ-
ences between pupils. Our effects are somewhat larger than those found in studies that
employ difference-in-differences methods. Consequently, although our models do seek to
control for the different types of of school and pupil selection bias, we stop short of claiming
that specialist school attendance has a causal effect on these school outcomes. Nevertheless,
they are indicative of an effect, which in turn implies that specialist schools may have an
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indirect effect on post school outcomes (e.g. via test scores) as well as a possible direct effect.
Our analysis of the direct and indirect effects of the specialist schools policy on post-school
outcomes, such as labour market status, A-Level qualifications and wages, is again suggestive
of statistically significant effects. There are several interesting findings. First, we find a sta-
tistically significant direct effect of the policy on the probability of finding a job after leaving
school and this effect increases and persists up to the age of 19 (wave 3). It should be noted,
however, that the indirect effect of the policy on the employment probability is smaller and
negative, which implies that the net effect is still positive. Second, we find no effect of the
policy on wages although we have very few observations for this part of the analysis. Third,
the direct effect of the policy on A-Level test scores is negative, statistically significant, and
large but there is a small countervailing indirect effect. This is counter-intuitive, however,
we also find that pupils who attended specialist schools study more subjects and hence their
effort is spread more thinly which may explain the fact that their average A-Level scores are
lower than their counterparts from non-specialist schools.
What this analysis suggests is that when evaluating the costs and benefits of educational
policies it is important to look beyond the effects on school outcomes, which is itself a
contentious issue because of the problems of identifying causal effects, to also consider their
effects (direct and indirect) on post-school outcomes. By doing so policy makers will be able
to get closer to evaluating whether a particular policy initiative delivers value for money. Our
own work is preliminary. Ideally, we would like to have more cohorts of data to analyse and
we would like to observe individuals in later stages of life so that we can obtain more robust,
and reliable, estimates of the policy effects but also so that we can address the question of
whether educational policies have long term labour market effects.
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A Appendix: Testing the validity of the CIA assump-
tion
The CIA is not directly testable, because the data are uninformative about the distribution
of Yi(0) for the treated and of Yi(1) for the control group. We therefore use two indirect
tests from the literature. One test, developed by Imbens (2004), proposes an indirect way
of assessing the CIA, based on the estimation of a ‘pseudo’ confounding factor that should,
if the CIA holds, have zero effect. We adopt the method proposed by Ichino et al. (2008).
This is based on the prediction of a confounding factor, A, by simulating its distribution for
each treated and control unit. Then, estimates of the average treatment effect of the treated
(ATT) are derived by including the confounding factor in the set of matching variables.
Different assumptions on the distribution of A imply different possible scenarios of deviation
from the CIA.
For simplicity, let A be a binary variable, its distribution is given by fixing the following
parameters
P (A = 1|T = i, Y = j) = pij i, j = 0, 1
Where Y is a binary test score outcome (e.g. ‘high ability’= 1 and ‘low ability’= 0) and
T is the pupil’s treatment status. In this way, we can define the probability of A = 1 in
each of the four groups identified by the treatment and the outcome.9 In our analysis, we
assume that the confounding variable follows the same distribution as that of the pupil test
scores prior to entry to secondary school (i.e. Key Stage 2 scores). Therefore A can be
thought as a measure of the ability of the pupil that secondary schools ‘observe’ in making
selection decisions. The effect of bias on the estimation of the policy varies depending on
the dataset used.10 The variable A is included in the set of variables used to estimate the
9The simplifying assumption that the simulation of A does not depend on X does not change the inter-
pretation of the test. For a complete explanation of the test see Ichino et al. (2008).
10For example, for the NPD we obtain the following parameters: p11 = 0.76, p10 = 0.30, p01 = 0.73, p00 =
0.29; p11 can be interpreted as the proportion of ‘high ability’ pupils in specialist schools who get high test
scores. In contrast in the LSYPE we get p11 = 0.72, p10 = 0.28, p01 = 0.75, p00 = 0.33, where there is a
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propensity score and the ATT is estimated using the nearest neighbour algorithm.11 The
ATT is re-estimated 500 times, and the values presented in our Tables are an average over
the distribution of A(See NN with confounder).
Given this set up, if the confounded estimates are still significant, but with the same sign
and (similar) in magnitude when compared to the ‘true’ estimates, we can be fairly confident
of the robustness of our results.
The second method we adopt has been proposed by Rosenbaum (1987) and involves only
one parameter, representing the association of T and A, and derives bounds for significance
levels and confidence intervals. Specifically, it computes the upper and lower bounds on
the Mantel and Haenszel (MH, 1959) test-statistic used to test the null hypothesis of no
treatment effect. In particular, eγ measures the degree of departure from a situation that
is free of hidden bias (eγ = 1) and we use eγ in the range [1,2]; γ represents the effect of
an unobserved variable on the probability of attendance at a specialist school.12 The test
can be interpreted as the difference in the relative odds of attending a specialist school for
two pupils that appear similar in terms of observable covariates, x. If those most likely to
go to specialist schools are more able, then there is positive unobserved selection and the
estimated treatment effects overestimate the true treatment effect. In general, DiPrete and
Gangl (2004) stress that the results of this test are worst-case scenarios, insofar as they only
reveal how the hidden bias might alter inference.
slightly higher probability of ‘high ability’ pupils obtaining high test scores attending non-specialist schools.
11We omit the results for different matching methods because they are very similar.
12Thus Pr(Di = 1|xi, ui) = F (βxi + γui) is the probability of attending a specialist school and F is the
logistic distribution. The odds that pupil i attends a specialist school is given by Pi(1−Pi) = exp(βxi + γui),





= exp(γ(ui−uj)). For simplicity, u is assumed to be





≤ eγ . In our work, we apply
the routines mbound and rbounds available in Stata. A detailed explanation of the method can be found in
Rosenbaum (1995), Aakvik (2001), DiPrete and Gangl (2004).
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Table 1: Dependent variables
Panel A: test scores YCS11-12
Gcsescore Gcsebin Gcsebin10 Truancy proportions
mean −5 +5 −10 +10 Non-Truant Truant
Non-specialist (YCS11) 43.124 54.19 52.90 55.73 37.85 51.39 57.04
n 2,796
Specialist (YCS12) 45.904 45.81 47.10 44.27 62.15 48.61 42.96
n 2,448
Total 5,244 1,705 3,539 4,536 708 3,573 1,648
Panel B: post-school test scores YCS12
A level score A level number
C T n C T n
mean 5.01 5.35 5.12 2.24 2.40 2.30
s.d. 6.06 6.19 6.10 2.12 2.08 2.11




























































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Policy-off policy-on analysis using the YCS11-12
Gcsescore Gcsebin Gcsebin10 Truancy St.Bias
unmatched 2.761 0.012 0.085 -0.047 5.201
(0.443) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (4.202)
NN1 1.732 -0.013 0.072 -0.035 1.601
(0.593) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018) (1.438)
NN1 with counfounder 1.385 -0.030 0.063 -0.054
(0.691) (0.021) (0.015) (0.023)
Kernel0.1 1.988 -0.012 0.078 -0.043 0.937





eγ = 1 eγ = 1.25 eγ = 1.50 eγ = 1.75 eγ = 2
Gcsescore 2.65*** 1.0-4.3*** -0.40-5.6 -1.55-6.7 -2.55-7.65
Gcsebin10 4.0*** 2.60-5.45*** 1.47-6.66* 0.53-7.72 0.11-8.66
Std. err. in parenthesis.
Balancing Property and Common Support satisfied.Analytical s.e. for NN, Bootstrap 500 repetitions for Kernel




where: xnon−sp = mean of the non-specialist schools group
xspec = mean of the specialist school group, s
2
non−sp = variance of the non-specialist schools group
s2spec = variance of the specialist school group.
Significance of MH statistic bound indicates treatment effect is not sensitive to selection bias.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: The effect of the specialist schools policy on wages
wave1 wave2 wave3
specscore -0.112 0.900 0.057
(0.533) (1.713) (0.468)
Gcsescore 0.000 0.016 0.003
(0.004) (0.015) (0.003)
Gcsescore × specscore 0.006 -0.027 -0.003
(0.014) (0.054) (0.010)
restriction 65% pct
specs65 0.025 0.066 0.001
(0.045) (0.186) (0.026)
Gcsescore 0.002 0.013 0.003
(0.003) (0.013) (0.001)
Gcsescore × specs65 -0.000 -0.015 -0.002
(0.009) (0.045) (0.005)
Std. err. in parenthesis.
Table 6: The effect of the specialist schools policy on post school qualifications












Gcsescore × specs65 0.134 0.003
(0.031) (0.008)
Std. err. in parenthesis.
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